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INTRODUCTION
In the world of capital punishment, the oft-repeated refrain “death
is different” stands for the notion that when the state exercises its most
awesome power—the power to take human life—every procedural
protection should be provided.1 Every safeguard should be met. Granted,
doing so makes the death penalty cumbersome. And granted, it slows what

* S.D Roberts and Sandra Moore Professor of Law, University of Richmond
School of Law. I thank Eric Berger, Joel Eisen, Jessica Erickson, and Jim Gibson
for their comments on an earlier draft, and the Belmont Law Review for inviting me
to participate in this worthy event.
1. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (“As we have often
stated, there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and
lesser punishments. ‘Death is a different kind of punishment from any other which
may be imposed in this country. . . . From the point of view of the defendant, it is
different in both its severity and its finality.’”) (quoting Gardener v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (because
death is different, capital punishment may not be imposed unless “every safeguard
is ensured”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“[T]he
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. . . . Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.”).
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Justice Blackmun famously called “the machinery of death.”2 But when the
stakes are literally life and death, the idea is that we ought to make sure that
whatever the state does, it does right.
Scholars have lamented the way that this idea of death penalty
exceptionalism has played out in the capital punishment context,3 but in the
administrative law context, “death is different” takes on a new meaning
altogether. In the administrative law context, “death is different” means
suspension of the rules that ordinarily apply to administrative decisionmaking. It means that when the state is carrying out its most solemn of
duties, those subject to its reach receive not more protection, but less.
The place that most clearly illustrates the point is the execution
setting. Prosecutors ask for death sentences, and judges and juries impose
them, but the people who actually carry out those sentences are corrections
department officials—administrative agency personnel. The execution
setting stands at the crossroads of capital punishment and administrative
law. This is where to look to see what happens when the two intersect.4
In this symposium contribution, I explore a little known nook of
administrative law, examining how administrative law norms work in the
execution setting—specifically, in the context of lethal injection.5 What I
2. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the
machinery of death.”).
3. For critiques of the Supreme Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence,
see, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARVARD L. REV. 355, 397–402 (1995); Deborah W. Denno, “Death Is Different”
and Other Twists of Fate, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1992); Margaret
Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980); William S. Geimer, Death at any Cost: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from its Death Penalty Standards,
12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1985).
4. This is not to say that the execution setting is the only place where
administrative law and capital punishment intersect. For another prominent
example, see Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row?
The Harm of Legislative Silence, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 525 (2016) (discussing
administrative law in the context of death row); see also Richard A. Bierschbach,
The Administrative Law of the Eighth (and Sixth) Amendment, in THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT 118–32 (2020)
(exploring administrative law norms in the context of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments more generally).
5. For all practical purposes, the lethal injection context is the execution
context. Every executing state employs lethal injection as the sole or at least
primary execution method, and executions by lethal injection are how the vast
majority of executions have been conducted in the modern era of the death
penalty—that is, since 1976. See generally DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, OVERVIEW OF LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOLS, at https://deathpenalty
info.org/executions/lethal-injection/overview-of-lethal-injection-protocols.
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find is death penalty exceptionalism turned on its head. Lethal injection
statutes provide no guidance whatsoever to the corrections departments that
must implement them. Prison personnel have no expertise in deciding what
drugs to use or how to perform the procedure. And the usual administrative
law devices that we rely on to bring transparency and accountability to the
agency decision-making process are noticeably absent. The culmination of
these irregularities is a world where lethal injection drug protocols are
decided by Google searches and other decision-making processes that
would be patently unacceptable in any other area of administrative law. In
the execution context, death penalty exceptionalism means that the minimal
standards that ordinarily attend administrative decision-making do not
apply. Death is different, but in a perverse way.
In the pages that follow, I substantiate this claim first by examining
lethal injection statutes and the lack of guidance they give to prison
administrators. Next I turn to a bedrock assumption of administrative law—
agency expertise—and show that when it comes to lethal injection,
corrections department personnel do not have any. Finally, I explore how
death penalty exceptionalism plays out in the context of administrative
norms like accountability and transparency, discussing the secrecy
surrounding lethal injection and administrative law’s role in maintaining it.
I close with a few thoughts about the implications of this state of affairs for
both the death penalty and administrative law, concluding that the result is
not good for either.
I. LETHAL INJECTION STATUTES
The discussion starts, as it must, with state lethal injection statutes
because they are the mechanism by which states adopted lethal injection. In
addition, they contain the instructions that state legislatures gave to state
departments of correction (DOCs) for implementing it. To understand
administrative law’s application to these statutes, it is first important to
understand how remarkably little these statutes say.
Lethal injection statutes are shockingly short. In Alabama, for
example, the lethal injection statute simply says: “A death sentence shall be
executed by lethal injection” unless the inmate elects otherwise.6 The
statutes in Florida, Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina, Missouri, and Utah
use the same or similar wording, specifying nothing more than “lethal
injection” as the state’s method of execution.7 The statutes in seventeen
6. ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a) (2018).
7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 922.105(1) (2005) (“A death sentence shall be
executed by lethal injection unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively
elects to be executed by electrocution.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (2016) (“The
Director, or the assistants appointed by him, shall at the time named in the
sentence…cause the prisoner under sentence of death to be electrocuted or injected
with a lethal substance, until he is dead.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114 (2014)

2021]

DEATH PENALTY EXCEPTIONALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

555

other states use more words but they are no more specific. In Texas,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, and a dozen other states, the lethal
injection statutes state only that executions are to occur “by intravenous
injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause
death and until such a convict is dead,” with slight variations in the wording
here and there.8 In each of these examples, the state statute says nothing
more than: “We want lethal injection.”
For the record, saying more than this is not an impossible feat for a
legislative body. A handful of state legislatures (six to be exact) have done
it. Three states—Mississippi, Oregon, and Wyoming—have legislatively
authorized the traditional three-drug protocol.9 Two others, Montana and
(“For any person who commits an offense for which the person is sentenced to the
punishment of death, the method for carrying out this sentence shall be by lethal
injection.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 (1995) (“A person convicted of a capital
crime and having imposed upon him the sentence of death shall suffer the penalty
by electrocution or, at the election of the person, lethal injection”); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 546.720 (2007) (“The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by
the administration of lethal gas or by means of the administration of lethal
injection.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(1)(a) (2015) (“When a defendant is
convicted of a capital felony and the judgment of death has been imposed, lethal
intravenous injection is the method of execution.”).
8. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14 (West 2014)
(“Whenever the sentence of death is pronounced against a convict, the sentence
shall be executed…by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal
quantity sufficient to cause death and until such convict is dead.”); OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, § 1014 (2016) (“The punishment of death shall be carried out by the
administration of a lethal quantity of a drug or drugs until death.”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2949.22 (West 2001) (“[A] death sentence shall be executed by
causing the application to the person, upon whom the sentence was imposed, of a
lethal injection of a drug or combination of drugs of sufficient dosage to quickly
and painlessly cause death. The application of the drug or combination of drugs
shall be continued until the person is dead.”); G A. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38 (2010)
(“All persons who have been convicted of a capital offense and have had imposed
upon them a sentence of death shall suffer such punishment by lethal injection.
Lethal injection is the continuous intravenous injection of a substance or substances
sufficient to cause death into the body of the person sentenced to death until such
person is dead.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (West 1998) (“[E]very death
sentence shall be executed by continuous intravenous injection of a substance or
combination of substances sufficient to cause death. The lethal injection shall
continue until the prisoner is dead.”). For more examples, see LA. STAT. § 15:569
(2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a)
(1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.355 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West
2016); IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1(a) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.180 (1996);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (2009); IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-188 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-32 (2008).
9. The traditional three-drug protocol calls for a barbiturate to render the
inmate insensate, followed by a paralytic to induce paralysis, followed by
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Pennsylvania, have legislatively chosen a two-drug protocol.10 And one
state—Arkansas—has legislatively chosen a one-drug protocol, the same
protocol that veterinarians use to euthanize pets.11 State legislatures can do
more than just choose lethal injection. They can provide the most basic
contours of what that means by deciding the number of drugs in the
protocol and the type of drugs to use. By and large, they just have not done
so.
Curiously, states have done so in the animal euthanasia context.
When it comes to animal euthanasia, most states have a law on the books
specifying the drugs that can be used, or at least the drugs that cannot be.12
This brings to mind one of the great ironies of the traditional three-drug
potassium chloride to stop the heart and induce death. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 9919-51 (2011) (“The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be by the
sequential intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of the following
substances: (a) an appropriate anesthetic or sedative; (b) a chemical paralytic agent;
and (c) potassium chloride, or other similarly effective substance, until death is
pronounced….”); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473 (2017) (“The punishment of death
shall be inflicted by the intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent and
potassium chloride or other equally effective substance sufficient to cause death.”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904 (2012) (“When a sentence of death is imposed by the
court in any criminal case, the punishment of death shall be executed by the
administration of a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate, alone or in combination with a chemical paralytic agent
and potassium chloride, or other equally effective substance or substances
sufficient to cause death, until death is pronounced….”).
10. The two-drug protocol omits the third drug, sodium chloride, which is
used to stop the heart. Interestingly, the protocols in both of these states actually
employ the three-drug protocol instead. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3)
(1999) (“The punishment of death must be inflicted by administration of a
continuous, intravenous injection of a lethal quantity of an ultra-fast-acting
barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until a coroner or deputy
coroner pronounces that the defendant is dead.”); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304
(2009) (“The death penalty shall be inflicted by injecting the convict with a
continuous intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting
barbiturate in combination with chemical paralytic agents approved by the
department until death is pronounced by the coroner.”); Eric Berger, Lethal
Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
259, 303 (2009) (“Several state statutes…refer only to a barbiturate and paralytic,
leaving out reference to potassium chloride, even though the protocol in practice
does include potassium.”).
11. The one-drug protocol is an overdose of a barbiturate. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-617(a)–(c) (2019).
12. For a detailed discussion of these statutes, see Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the
Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 817 (2008). A detailed listing of the statutes themselves appears at id.,
appendix II.
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lethal injection protocol—it uses a paralytic that most states prohibit for use
in putting down pets.13 But the point here is less about the substance of
these animal euthanasia statutes and more about the fact that these statutes
have substance. They designate the drugs. Indeed, over a dozen death
penalty states have both a generic lethal injection statute that says nothing
about the drugs and a specific animal euthanasia statute that specifies the
drugs that can, or cannot, be used in animal euthanasia.14
This dichotomy has not escaped the attention of death row inmates,
who have used it to support some innovative legal arguments. In a case
from Tennessee, for example, a death row inmate sought to capitalize on
the fact that the state’s lethal injection statute did not specify the drugs to be
used, while the state’s animal euthanasia statute did, prohibiting the use of a
paralytic because it increased the risk of a torturous death.15 The inmate
wanted his death to be governed by the animal euthanasia statute, so he
argued that he was “nonlivestock” under the state’s Nonlivestock Animal
Humane Death Act—he was an animal, after all, and he was not
livestock—which in turn allowed him to argue that he could not be
executed with the three-drug protocol because the protocol used a paralytic,
and a paralytic was prohibited by the Act. The court rejected the claim,
finding no evidence that the state legislature had intended for the animal
euthanasia statute to apply to humans.16 Fair enough. But the fact that the
inmate’s best bet was to sue as a member of the “nonlivestock” class is a
testament to the intellectually embarrassing reality that the induction of
death in animals has received way more legislative attention and care than
the induction of death in humans, who (at least in theory) have
constitutional rights protecting them from being executed any way the state
wants.
To be fair, state legislatures may have good reason for writing
generic lethal injection statutes, even as they write specific statutes for
animal euthanasia. Legislatures might want to give state DOCs flexibility to
change lethal injection drugs as supplies become unavailable.17 Or they may
not feel as though they have the expertise to decide even the most basic
13. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 839–44.
14. See id.
15. See Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV, 2004
Tenn. App. LEXIS 643, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004) (“Abdur’Rahman
asserts . . . that the inclusion of Pavulon in the Department’s three-drug lethal
injection protocol violates the Nonlivestock Animal Humane Death Act . . . . He
asserts that he is a ‘nonlivestock animal’ . . . and therefore cannot be included in
the lethal injection protocol because TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-17-303(c) prohibits
the use of ‘a neuromuscular blocking agent’ for the purpose of euthanizing
nonlivestock animals.”).
16. See id. at *6–8.
17. See Eric Berger, Death Penalty Administration: A Response to Alexandra
Klein’s Nondelegating Death, 82 OHIO ST. L. J. ONLINE 9, 14 (2020).
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contours of a lethal injection protocol.18 Or they may view choosing lethal
injection as policy-making, and all other choices as falling on the
implementation side of the line, which has traditionally been considered the
realm of agency decision-making.19 Or they may just surmise that just
choosing lethal injection is specific enough given that this is all they have
done with execution methods like hanging, electrocution, and death by
firing squad.
These are all cogent explanations, and they all have cogent
responses. By and large, the question is whether we want corrections
departments to have the flexibility to make up lethal injection protocols on
the fly; whether we think corrections departments operating in the shadows
have any more expertise than legislatures operating under the public eye;
whether we recognize the number of drugs in the protocol as a policy
choice in its own right; and whether we view lethal injection as different
from other execution methods in light of the fact that the choice of drugs
also determines the manner of death.20 In addition, one might reasonably
question whether lethal injection statutes that say next to nothing are a
reflection of any of these considerations, as opposed to just plain inattention
and the ability to reap the political benefits of signaling support for humane
executions without having to figure out what that actually means.21
An in-depth discussion of these issues would take more time and
space than is warranted here, so I save a more fulsome discussion for
another day.22 Here I simply acknowledge that why state legislatures have
passed generic lethal injection statutes is a story of its own. Legislatures do
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Hanging uses a rope, the electric chair uses electricity, the firing squad
uses bullets, and the gas chamber uses cyanide gas. Lethal injection uses drugs, and
unlike other execution methods, the particular drug combination that it uses
determines how an inmate dies. A one-drug protocol kills by a barbiturate
overdose, for example, while a three-drug protocol kills by inducing cardiac arrest.
See supra notes 9-11. The only comparable execution method would be the gas
chamber, and there state statutes did not say ‘use any gas, just figure this out
yourselves’—they made clear that execution by gas chamber meant execution using
cyanide gas. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ca., 503 U.S. 653
(1992) (denying certiorari to claim that “execution by cyanide gas was cruel and
unusual punishment”); id. at 657 (J. Stevens, dissenting to denial of certiorari and
discussing “the California statute requiring execution by cyanide gas [] enacted in
1937”); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983) (denying certiorari to claim that
“death by cyanide” is cruel and unusual); id. at 1240–47 (J. Marshall, dissenting to
denial of certiorari and discussing state statutes authorizing death by cyanide gas).
21. The lack of legislative history or hearings suggests the latter. For an
extended discussion, see CORINNA BARRETT LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION: WHY WE
CAN’T GET IT RIGHT AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT US (book-in-progress, on file with
author).
22. See LAIN, supra note 21.
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what they do for a reason, sometimes several of them. But in the context of
the current discussion, what matters is not the reason, but rather the result.
The result is a sea of generic lethal injection statutes that delegate
every aspect of lethal injection—what is to be injected and how—to
corrections department personnel. Some state statutes do so explicitly,
providing that “such execution procedure shall be determined and
supervised” by the DOC, while others do not even say that much,
delegation being the inevitable result of a statute that says next to nothing.23
Either way, the point is that these statutes leave every iota of lethal injection
decision-making to prison personnel. From the number of drugs in the
protocol, to the type of drugs used, to the qualifications of the
executioners—these and a host of other decisions that determine whether
lethal injection is torturous or humane are left for prison personnel to figure
out for themselves, with no guidance from the legislature on the front side
and no guidelines by which to judge their decisions on the backside. Lethal
injection is not just grossly under-regulated by state legislatures. In the vast
majority of states, it is not regulated by the legislature at all.
This brings me to the administrative law implications of these
generic lethal injection statutes, and specifically, to the non-delegation
doctrine. In theory, the non-delegation doctrine forbids the wholesale
delegation of legislative power, requiring that any delegation of legislative
authority be accompanied by an “intelligible principle” to guide agency
decision-making.24 At the federal level, the non-delegation doctrine is
notoriously lax (at least for now).25 But at the state level, where lethal
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2002) (“Punishment by
death shall, in all cases, be inflicted by intravenous injection . . . and such
execution procedure shall be determined and supervised by the Commissioner of
the Department of Correction.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West 2016) (“The
punishment of death shall be inflicted by the administration of a lethal gas or by an
intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to
cause death, by standards established under the direction of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.”); IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (2009) (“The director of
the Idaho department of correction shall determine the procedures to be used in any
execution.”).
24. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(requiring that Congress “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized [to exercise the delegated authority] is
directed to conform” and holding that so long as this is done, “such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”); accord Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Gundy v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (“The constitutional question is whether Congress has
supplied an intelligible principle to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.”).
25. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting), joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, suggests some
interest in enforcing the doctrine with renewed vigor going forward (“While it’s
been some time since the Court last held that a statute improperly delegated the
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injection statutes are found, the doctrine is more robust and “alive and well”
(to quote the title of one prominent article on the issue).26
Yet even if that were not the case—even if states required no more
than an “intelligible principle” to guide agency decision-making—it is hard
to see how these lethal injection statutes pass muster. It may well be the
case that legislatures pass generic statutes that delegate vast swaths of
decision-making to agencies all the time. Indeed, I assume for the purposes
of discussion that this is true. But it is one thing to delegate vast amounts of
decision-making to an agency, and quite another to delegate the entire
thing. What, pray tell, is the “intelligible principle” guiding the
implementation of lethal injection when all the statute says is “lethal
injection”?
This was the Arkansas Supreme Court’s point when it struck down
the state’s lethal injection statute on non-delegation grounds in 2012. “A
statute that, in effect, reposes an absolute, unregulated, and undefined
discretion in an administrative agency . . . is an unlawful delegation of
legislative powers,” the Court stated.27 It then went on to say:
It is evident to this court that the legislature has abdicated
its responsibility and passed to the executive branch, in this
case the ADC [Arkansas Department of Corrections], the
unfettered discretion to determine all protocol and
procedures, most notably the chemicals to be used, for a
state execution. The [statute] fails to provide reasonable
guidelines for the selection of chemicals to be used during
lethal injection and it fails to provide any general policy
with regard to the lethal-injection procedure.28
This is why Arkansas is one of the six states that do not have a generic
lethal injection statute. Its judiciary required the legislature to actually
legislate, and the legislature chose a one-drug protocol.
Notably, Arkansas is the only state in the Union to have invalidated
a lethal injection statute on non-delegation grounds, despite plenty of
inmates trying. As Alex Klein notes in her work in this area, some state
courts have rejected these challenges on the notion that corrections
legislative power to another branch—thanks in no small measure to the intelligible
principle misadventure—the Court has hardly abandoned the business of policing
improper legislative delegations.”).
26. Jason Iuliano and Keith Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive
and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619 (2017). For a taxonomy of the various state
non-delegation doctrines, see generally Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the
Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999).
27. Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Ark. 2012).
28. Id. at 854.
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department officials are better qualified to make drug decisions (a point I
will turn to in short order).29 Other courts say that the Eighth Amendment’s
“cruel and unusual punishments” clause provides its own limit on agency
choices, which is true, but also proves too much—the Eighth Amendment
always applies, so if that is enough to satisfy the doctrine, the doctrine will
always be satisfied.30 Still other courts say that defining the basic contours
of lethal injection is something that legislatures cannot “practically or
efficiently” do for themselves, apparently unaware of the fact that
legislatures have done it and survived just fine.31
It may well be that the implications of a robust non-delegation
doctrine more generally are quietly driving these decisions,32 but whatever
the reason, what matters (again) is the result. Outside of Arkansas, the nondelegation doctrine has had nothing to say about state lethal injection
statutes, despite the fact that these statutes fail to guide agency decisionmaking in any way. Non-delegation claims fail even though lethal injection
statutes would appear to fit the doctrine like a glove.
Such broad delegations of legislative power might not be so
worrisome if those on the receiving end of the delegation—prison
administrators—had the know-how to implement lethal injection. But they
do not. Why that is so, and what happens as a result, is the point I turn to
next.
II. AGENCY EXPERTISE
The entire premise of the modern administrative state rests on a
claim about institutional competency, and underlying that claim is an
assumption of agency expertise.33 However problematic broad delegations
29. See Alexandra L. Klein, Nondelegating Death, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 923, 955–
62 (2020) (discussing non-delegation challenges in state courts and the reasons
they have failed); see, e.g., Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000); State v.
Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 515
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
30. See Klein, supra note 29, at 955–62 (discussing non-delegation challenges
in state courts and the reasons they have failed); see, e.g., Cook v. State, 281 P.3d
1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
31. See Klein, supra note 29, at 955–62 (discussing non-delegation challenges
in state courts and the reasons they have failed); see, e.g., Ex parte Granviel, 561
S.W.2d at 514.
32. See Berger, supra note 17, at 12–13.
33. See James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 365 (1976) (“The premise that administrative agencies have a
substantive expertise in their areas of regulatory responsibility was readily accepted
by the courts and has become the basis of a considerable body of administrative
law . . . ”); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in
Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1097, 1097 (2015) (“Expertise plays a starring role in administrative law.
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of legislative power may be, those concerns have thus far been offset by the
notion that agencies bring to the table something that legislatures cannot—
informed decision-making based on expertise. Expertise is by and large the
raison d'être of an agency’s existence.34 It is also a primary reason that
courts defer to the decisions that administrative agencies make.35
As already noted, most states have a lethal injection statute that
explicitly or implicitly delegates the implementation of lethal injection to
the state corrections department, which means that responsibility for
developing the protocol to execute an inmate falls to whoever is in charge
of the DOC.36 The person in charge of the state DOC—the DOC director,
or commissioner in some states—has no training or expertise remotely
relevant to lethal injection. Neither do the corrections department officials
who work under these department heads. Corrections department personnel
may be experts in prison discipline and security, but lethal injection is a
medical procedure (of sorts) and these people have about as much
knowledge of what it takes to perform a medical procedure as your average
person on the street. And that is just the procedure itself. Then there are the
drugs that the procedure administers. Knowledge of what drugs to use for
lethal injection requires expertise in the field of anesthesiology (or at least
pharmacology), and corrections department officials do not have that either.
Of course, it would not matter that corrections department officials
do not have expertise if they could get it—if they could get an
anesthesiologist or perhaps some other doctor in the know to tell them what
drugs to use. But that is a problem in its own right. Medical ethics have
long prohibited use of the healing arts for the induction of death, so doctors
are rightly reticent to help in the first place,37 and that is especially true of
Congress establishes administrative agencies and often gives them substantial
discretion because it lacks the expertise and political agreement to resolve the
policy issues that are likely to arise under a statutory scheme.”); Wendy E. Wagner,
A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential
Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2023 (2015) (“Although the hypertechnicality of
agency rules is a more recent phenomenon, the basic concept that the agencies
should preside over specialized information is hard-wired into the design of the
administrative state.”).
34. See Freedman, supra note 33, at 363.
35. See generally Wagner, supra note 33, at 8. For an example, see
Lightborne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d. 326, 352 (Fla. 2007) (adopting a
“presumption of deference” that “the methodology and the chemicals to be used are
matters best left to the Department of Corrections”).
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS
OPINION 9.7.3 (2016) (“An individual’s opinion on capital punishment is the
personal moral decision of the individual. However, as a member of a profession
dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so, a physician must not
participate in a legally authorized execution.”). This is not to say that states never
get doctors to oversee the execution process; they do. But doctors are reticent to
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anesthesiologists. Anesthesiologists have to be board-certified to have
practice privileges in hospitals, and the American Board of Anesthesiology
has threatened to revoke the certification of any member who assists in
lethal injection in any way, including advising.38 As a result, corrections
department officials have an exceedingly difficult time getting specialists to
advise them on how to kill with drugs.39
The result is what Justice Stevens lamented in his concurrence in
Baze v. Reez, the Supreme Court’s 2008 lethal injection case: “Drugs [are]
selected by unelected Department of Corrections officials with no
specialized knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or
guidance.”40 Lethal injection scholar Debby Denno, who was watching the
Baze trial, later wrote about the oddity of listening to the testimony of
prison officials who were on the one hand articulate and professional, and
on the other, palpably ignorant of the procedure they were in charge of

participate and most front line executions are paramedics. For a more extended
discussion of the point, see generally Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician
Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11 (2009); LAIN,
supra note 21, chapter 9 (“Doctors Don’t Want to Share Their Expertise”) (on file
with author).
38. See Anesthesiologists and Capital Punishment, AM. BOARD OF
ANESTHESIOLOGY (May 2014), https://theaba.org/pdfs/Capital_Punishment.pdf
(“[I]t is the ABA’s position that an anesthesiologist should not participate in an
execution by lethal injection and that violation of this policy is inconsistent with
the Professional Standing criteria required for ABA Certification and Maintenance
of Certification in Anesthesiology or any of its subspecialties. As a consequence,
ABA certificates may be revoked if the ABA determines that a diplomate
participates in an execution by lethal injection.”).
39. For a time, states employed the services of anesthesiologist Mark
Dershwitz. Dershwitz served as a testifying expert for 22 states over the course of a
decade, but one suspected that he did more than just testify, and that suspicion was
confirmed in 2014, when he was caught advising Ohio on its protocol in the wake
of the botched execution of Dennis McGuire. Dershwitz denied it, but emails told a
different story, and he found himself at risk of losing his board certification with
the ABA. An announcement from Dershwitz withdrawing from the field followed
shortly thereafter, and requests for comment were met by the statement: “As
requested by the American Board of Anesthesiology, I do not discuss lethal
injection in any venue.” For the full story, see Ben Crair, Exclusive Emails Show
Ohio’s Doubts About Lethal Injection, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 17, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/119068/exclusive-emails-reveal-states-worriesabout-problematic-execution; Expert Witness in U.S. Execution Cases Will No
Longer Defend States’ Methods, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2014/aug/20/expert-witness-execution-cases-quits-ohio; Annie
Waldman, Key Expert in Supreme Court Lethal Injection Case Did His Research
on Drugs.com, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/
key-expert-in-supreme-court-lethal-injection-case-did-research-drugs.com.
40. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 74–75 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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administering.41 Those officials were “the victims of legislatures’ statewide
romance with lethal injection—the details of which are left to the
imagination of ill-informed prison personnel,” Denno wrote, adding that
“[t]his process does not seem fair to those on the lowest level of the
political hierarchy, much less to the inmates who bear the brunt of such an
irresponsible degree of delegation.”42
A decade later, nothing has changed. In 2017, for example, lethal
injection litigation in Tennessee led to a hearing that featured the testimony
of two top corrections department officials. The state’s DOC commissioner,
who had ostensibly chosen the drugs in the state’s lethal injection protocol,
did not know the difference between sodium thiopental, a barbiturate, and
midazolam, a benzodiazepine.43 Those are two different classes of drugs
with two very different properties.44 And the warden, described by one
media observer as “alarmingly ill-informed,” did not know the details of the
lethal injection procedure he was responsible for administering, and had no
idea what to do in the event a contingency might arise.45 Time and again,
corrections department officials have demonstrated a shocking lack of
understanding of the drugs in the lethal injection protocols that they are
responsible for administering—and this is what they say after they have
been prepped for testimony on the witness stand.
To be clear, this lack of expertise is not entirely prison
administrators’ fault. Law Professor Eric Berger, who has both litigated
lethal injection as a practicing attorney and now writes about it as a scholar,
makes an important point in this regard. Reflecting on his experience with
the prison officials he encountered as a litigator, he writes:
I did not come away with the impression that the
responsible state officials were vicious people who enjoyed
inflicting pain. Nor did I think that they had made the
decision to ignore the Constitution and get away with what

41. See Deborah W. Denno, Death Bed, 124 TRI-QUARTERLY J. 141, 160
(2006).
42. Id. at 150.
43. See Liliana Segura, “Our Most Cruel Experiment Yet:” Chilling
Testimony in a Tennessee Trial Exposes Lethal Injection as Court-Sanctioned
Torture, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/05/deathpenalty-lethal-injection-trial-tennessee/.
44. See Christine L.H. Snozek, CNS Depressants: Benzodiazepines and
Barbiturates, in TOXICOLOGY CASES FOR THE CLINICAL AND FORENSIC
LABORATORY 209-217 (2020), https://books.google.com/books?id=n8i2DwAAQB
AJ&pg=PA209&lpg=PA209&dq=Christine+L.H.+Snozek,+Toxicology+Cases+
for+the+Clinical+and+Forensic+Laboratory&source=bl&ots=PitfrEbOZo&sig=A
CfU3U0pmwmj4s0Ih1k2WFpyTtR8MGz4g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj4vMu
h6a3tAhVSEVkFHSHzACgQ6AEwBnoECAcQAg#v=onepage&q&f=false.
45. Segura, supra note 43.
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they could. Rather, I think the state had given some
employees a difficult task for which they were mostly
poorly qualified.46
Prison personnel were “out of their depth,” Berger writes—they were
“tasked with an extremely difficult job without the training or resources to
even know where to begin.”47
What, then, do prison administrators do when they cannot access
the expertise to figure out lethal injection for themselves? Anyone familiar
with the workplace saying “sh** rolls downhill”48 knows the answer: they
pass the job to someone else. They outsource it, if only because that is the
only thing they know to do.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is what Oklahoma
DOC officials did when their state legislature passed the first lethal
injection statute in the country, and they found themselves tasked with
devising the first lethal injection protocol to go with it. These officials did
not know what to do, so they turned to the man who had advised the
legislature—Jay Chapman, the state medical examiner, who once referred
to himself as “an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them
that way.”49 Chapman, as lethal injection scholar Ty Alper has written,
“gave the matter about as much thought as you might put in developing a
protocol for stacking dishes in a dishwasher.”50 Chapman just came up with
the protocol. In a day. Off the top of his head. “I didn’t do any research,”
Chapman later stated, adding, “I just knew from having been placed under
anesthesia myself, what was needed.”51
46. Eric Berger, Lethal Injection, Politics, and the Future of the Death
Penalty: The Death Penalty and Lethal Injection: The Executioners’ Dilemmas, 49
U. RICH. L. REV. 731, 758 (2015).
47. Id.
48. Yes, that is actually a thing. URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urban
dictionary.com/define.php?term=shit%20rolls%20down%20hill (last visited Dec.
8, 2020). See also TANDEM SPRING,“Shit Rolls Downhill” But What If There Was
No “Shit” and No “Hill”?, (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.tandemspring.com/shitrolls-downhill-but-what-if-there-was-no-shit-and-no-hill/ (“Think of the common
workplace phrase ‘Shit rolls downhill.’ Which, if you’re not familiar with it, simply
means that the lowest ranking person in an organization nearly always gets stuck
doing the task nobody wants to do.”).
49. Max Kutner, Meet A. Jay Chapman, “Father of the Lethal Injection,”
NEWSWEEK (May 1, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/jay-chapman-inventorlethal-injection-arkansas-592506.
50. Ty Alper, What Do Lawyers Know About Lethal Injection, 1 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. (Online) (Mar. 3, 2008), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/dpc/2008.
Alper.harvardlawandpolicy.pdf.
51. Jamie Fellner & Sarah Tofte, So Long As They Die: Lethal Injections in
the United States, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 15 (2006), https://www.hrw.org/
reports/2006/us0406/ [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
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DOC officials in other states did not know any more about lethal
injection than the Oklahoma DOC did, so the easiest thing for them to do
when their legislatures passed lethal injection statutes was just to copy
Oklahoma’s protocol, which is exactly what they did. “In developing a
lethal injection protocol, [the Kentucky DOC] did not conduct any
independent scientific or medical studies or consult any medical
professionals concerning the drugs and the dosage amounts to be injected
into the condemned,” the trial court in Baze concluded, adding, “Kentucky
appears to be no different from any other state.”52 Chapman was right in
saying of the 37 states that ended up adopting his three-drug protocol: “I
guess they just blindly followed it.”53 Across the country, state DOC
officials carelessly copied a protocol that had been carelessly designed in
the first place. But given the enormity of task thrust upon them and the
dearth of qualifications to go with it, it is hard to imagine what else these
corrections department officials were going to do.
A second example of the sort of outsourcing that has taken place as
a result of DOC officials’ lack of expertise highlights the vulnerability of
these officials to fraudsters who pose as experts willing to solve their
problems for a fee. In the 1980s, state DOCs around the country began
commissioning the services of a man who professed to be able to tell them
how to conduct lethal injection—Fred Leuchter.54 Leuchter was a
Holocaust denier who sold state DOCs a lethal injection “machine” that
guesstimated lethal doses of the drugs based on what he had read about
pigs.55 Even after Leuchter’s fake credentials came to light—his degree was
in history, not engineering as he had claimed—and Leuchter was charged
with criminal fraud, wardens shunned him in public but continued to ask
him for advice on the sly, so desperate were they for someone, anyone, who
could tell them how to conduct an execution by lethal injection.56
For those who are thinking, that was the ’80s, surely they have this
figured out now, think again. In 2006, lethal injection litigation in Missouri
revealed that the state DOC director had delegated the details of the state’s
lethal injection protocol to a doctor who had been sued for malpractice
twenty times and had his practice privileges revoked at two hospitals.57 In
52. Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *6 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
Div. I. July 8, 2005).
53. Josh Sanburn, Creator of Lethal Injection Method: ‘I Don’t See Anything
That Is More Humane,’ TIME MAG. (May 15, 2014), https://time.com/101143/
lethal-injection-creator-jay-chapman-botched-executions/.
54. See STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 74, 77, 86 (2002).
55. See id.
56. See Denno, supra note 41, at 148.
57. See Nick Welsh, The Death Penalty Is Experiencing Technical
Difficulties, THE PACIFIC STANDARD, June 14, 2017, https://psmag.com/socialjustice/the-death-penalty-is-experiencing-technical-difficulties-48729.
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his deposition, the doctor explained that the DOC director “ha[d] no
background in medicine” and thus was “totally dependent on me advising
him what could and should and will be done.”58 This was a particularly
acute problem because the doctor, who had presided over 54 executions in
Missouri by this time, was dyslexic and “sometimes transpose[d]
numbers.”59 “I am dyslexic and so . . . it’s not unusual for me to make
mistakes,” he stated under oath.60 Astoundingly, the state of Missouri
doubled-down on the doctor,61 fighting tooth and nail to keep him as its
executioner. The state lost that litigation battle when a federal court ruled
that the doctor could not “participate in any manner, at any level in the state
of Missouri’s lethal injection process.”62 The doctor went on to serve as an
executioner for Arizona and the federal government.63
The latest trend in lethal injection outsourcing is exemplified by
what happened behind the scenes of Oklahoma’s botched execution of
Clayton Lockett in 2014. Readers may remember the highly publicized
debacle—the execution was an agonizing 43 minutes long and featured
Lockett writhing on the gurney, mumbling in a semi-coherent fashion, and
repeatedly lurching against the restraints. Officials closed the blinds as
execution witnesses looked on in horror; Lockett had awakened in the midst
of his own execution, and the result was a grotesque display.64
What readers may not know is how Oklahoma came to choose the
drugs that it used in that execution, and that is where the outsourcing comes
into play. Oklahoma’s protocol at the time gave the warden “sole

58. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *5
(W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1077 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Director
Crawford indicated that he was confident in Dr. Doe I’s competence and expected
that he would continue working in the execution process.”).
62. Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D.
Mo. Sept. 12, 2006).
63. See Henry Weinstein, Doctor Barred By State Helps U.S. Executions, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-nov-15-najohndoe15-story.html [https://perma.cc/UN9Z-Q3DM]; M. Kiefer, Doctor Banned
from Executions in Mo. Now in Ariz., THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (July 24, 2008),
http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/07/24/20080724de
athpenaltydoc0724.html [https://perma.cc/67R9-PU9U].
64. For a detailed account of Lockett’s botched execution, see Ziva
Branstetter, Eyewitness Account: A Minute-by-Minute Look at What Happened
During Clayton Lockett’s Execution, THE TULSA WORLD (May 1, 2014),
https://tulsaworld.com/news/state/eyewitness-account-a-minute-by-minute-look-atwhat-happened/article_f7764efc-d036-11e3-af7e-0017a43b2370.html?_dc=322276
439517.73645 [https://perma.cc/8J2W-PNSP].

568

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 552

discretion” as to which drugs to use,65 but that was just the process on
paper. The warden did not know anything about lethal injection drugs, so
she was in no position to choose which drugs to use. The people who
actually made that decision were the lawyer for the Oklahoma DOC and a
lawyer in the state Attorney General’s office.66 “I didn’t write that policy. I
didn’t choose those drugs,” the warden would later tell investigators.
“I
was just—I’m told the drugs that’s gonna be used.”67
Of course, these lawyers were not anesthesiologists either, so how
did they determine that midazolam, a benzodiazepine, was an appropriate
substitution for pentobarbital, a barbiturate, when the state’s existing
stockpile of pentobarbital ran dry? “I did my own research, I looked online, you know. Went past the wikileaks, wiki leaks or whatever it is,” DOC
general counsel Mike Oakley told investigators.68 The internet had said that
midazolam “would render a person unconscious,” Oakley stated, adding,
“That’s what we needed . . . so we thought it was okay.”69
Oakley had read somewhere on the internet that midazolam could
render a person unconscious and thought that this made it an appropriate
substitution for pentobarbital—which means that he did not know they were
different classes of drugs, did not know why that was important, and did not
know that there are different levels of unconsciousness, one that will render
a person insensate to pain and one that will not.70 Had he done nothing
more than read the FDA warning label for the drug, he would have known
that midazolam is not approved for use as the sole anesthetic in a painful

65. See Cary Aspinwall & Ziva Branstetter, Execution of Clayton Lockett
Described as ‘a Bloody Mess,’ Court Filing Shows, THE TULSA WORLD (Dec. 14,
2014), https://tulsaworld.com/news/local/execution-of-clayton-lockett-described-as
-a-bloody-mess-court-filing-shows/article_a4b70b76-84f7-5ebd-a5f3044c205d474a.html [https://perma.cc/G3LW-CJ97].
66. See id.
67. Joint Appendix – Volume II at 15, Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015)
(No. 14-7955), (transcript of recorded interview of Anita Trammell by Trooper
Jason Hold and Trooper Kevin Logan). For the full interview, see DPS Interview of
OSP Warden Anita Trammell, THE TULSA WORLD (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://tulsaworld.com/dps-interview-of-osp-warden-anita-trammell/pdf_7b6599c060dd-5df4-a1c5-9184dbc3c90e.html [https://perma.cc/9Q4J-2NFC].
68. Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, Warner v.
Gross, No. CIV-14-0665-F, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181271, at *6 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 22, 2014) (quoting recorded interview of Mike Oakley and citing to DPS
interview p.1543.).
69. Id.
70. See American Society of Anesthesiologists, Continuum of Depth of
Sedation: Definition of General Anesthesia and Levels of Sedation/Analgesia (Oct.
23, 2019), https://www.asahq.org/standards-and-guidelines/continuum-of-depth-ofsedation-definition-of-general-anesthesia-and-levels-of-sedationanalgesia
[https://perma.cc/UB73-NAAF].
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procedure.71 Had he called a local pharmacy, he could have at least learned
that midazolam and pentobarbital are different classes of drugs and that
those classes have different properties, one that would produce anesthesia
and one that would not.72 Had he picked up the most basic pharmacology
textbook (the University of Oklahoma College of Medicine is right in
town), he would have seen graphs showing that midazolam cannot render a
person insensate, and he would have understood that it had everything to do
with its class as a drug.73 Oakley did none of these things. He did not even
keep a record of the websites he relied on in choosing the drug that the state

71. See Midazolam Injection, USP, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfd
a_docs/label/2017/208878Orig1s000lbl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3LR-DEEX]
(indications and usage at p. 15).
72. Midazolam is in the benzodiazepine class of drugs, a class that includes
Valium and Xanax and is known for its use in treating anxiety. Pentobarbital is in
the barbiturate class of drugs, a class known for its use in inducing anesthesia.
Barbiturates are much more potent than benzodiazepines. For a layman’s primer,
see What’s the Difference Between Benzodiazepines and Barbiturates?
https://www.springboardcenter.org/whats-the-difference-between-benzodiazepinesand-barbiturates/ [https://perma.cc/FUF5-UFXU].
73. Consider, for example, this graph from a leading pharmacology textbook:
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Figure 19.3. Dose response curves of barbiturates and
benzodiazepines. The barbiturates exhibit a linear dose response
effect. . . . Benzodiazepines exhibit a ceiling effect . . .
Benzodiapines administered by either route [oral or IV
administration] do not produce anesthesia.
GEORGE M. BRENNER & CRAIG STEVENS, PHARMACOLOGY 212 (5th ed. 2017); see
also LAURENCE L. BRUNTON ET AL., GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 403 (11th ed. 2005) (“The
benzodiazepines do not produce the same degrees of neuronal depression produced
by barbiturates and volatile anesthetics . . . . The clinical literature often refers to
the “anesthetic” effects and uses of certain benzodiazepines, but the drugs do not
cause a true general anesthesia . . . and immobility sufficient to allow surgery
cannot be achieved.”).
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would use to end an inmate’s life.74 What lawyer, in what world of
professional competence, does this?
As just mentioned, Oakley did not act alone; he was working with a
lawyer in the state AG’s office. That lawyer was John Hadden, and
Hadden’s contribution was reading a transcript of expert testimony on
midazolam from litigation over its use in executions in Florida.75 One might
plausibly justify Oklahoma’s decision to use midazolam based on Florida’s
decision to use midazolam, except for the fact that Florida was using 500
mg of midazolam, while the protocol that Hadden and Oakley wrote only
called for 100 mg.76 So did the lawyers think that using one-fifth the dosage
of the drug did not matter, or did they just not notice that they were using
one-fifth the dosage of the drug? The possibility that two lawyers could not
even copy a dosage right is almost unfathomable. But the possibility that
they would choose a dosage that was one-fifth that of the protocol they
were copying—particularly when the drug at issue is the one that is
supposed to render the inmate unconscious—is equally hard to fathom. The
incompetence is breath-taking either way.
In the wake of Lockett’s botched execution, condemned inmates
challenging Oklahoma’s protocol claimed that the DOC’s decision-making
was akin to “an approach one might expect of a high school student who
waited until the last moment to write a term paper—not the approach one
should expect of the State engaging in the taking of human life.”77 Whether
even high school students would have done better is an open question, but
one can say at least this: the sloppy decision-making of the state’s attorneys
in this case would not satisfy the duty of care in any area of the practice of
law. Not one.
Having shared the various ways that corrections departments
delegate the task of determining lethal injection protocols, I now pause to
74. See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 148–49, Warner v.
Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. CIV-14-655-F) (direct examination of
Michael Oakley) (“Q. And you may not remember this, but do you remember
specifically what pharmaceutical or pharmacy sites that you went to on the internet
for your own research? A. “I don’t remember.”).
75. See Joint Appendix – Volume II at 4–5, Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863
(2015) (No. 14-7955), (transcript of recorded interview of Anita Trammell by
Trooper Jason Hold and Trooper Kevin Logan). Oakley told investigators that they
did not reach out to the expert themselves for a consult because “as far as the
dosage and the amounts that he testified to, he wasn’t going to say anything
different on the witness stand here,” which makes Oklahoma’s adoption of
midazolam at a dosage that is 20% of what Florida was using all the more
unfathomable.
76. See Aspinwall & Branstetter, supra note 65.
77. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 58–59, Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-6244). And yet, the Supreme Court upheld the Oklahoma lethal
injection protocol, just one execution away from being the second most executing
state in the country. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).
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offer a few observations about it. First and most discretely, Oklahoma is
one of the most executing states in the country (or at least it was, until
mishaps like the botched Lockett execution forced it to put executions on
hold).78 This is an example of what lethal injection decision-making looks
like in a state that ostensibly knows what it is doing. Imagine what it looks
like in a state that does not.
Second, the sort of decision-making that we saw in Oklahoma is
not unusual. We know from lethal injection litigation that as states have had
to revise their lethal injection protocols, lawyers have taken on the task of
figuring out what drugs to use.79 One gets the sense that prison officials,
who are all too well aware of their own shortcomings in this area, are (as
others have surmised) “relieved to rid themselves of this assignment.”80 But
lawyers are no more qualified to be making decisions about lethal injection
protocols than corrections department personnel.81 Lawyers lack medical
expertise too.
Third and finally, the lack of expertise that marks the agency
decision-making process also marks the product of that process—the
protocols themselves. Oklahoma’s problematic protocol is one illustration
of the point, but others abound. Two states, for example, had lethal
injection protocols in 2004 and 2006 that called for half the dose of the
anesthetic to be administered at the start of the execution process and the
other half at the end, after administration of the drug that induces cardiac
arrest, and death.82 “It is nonsensical to administer any drug, and especially
an anesthetic drug, to a dead person,” an anesthesiologist later said of the
protocol, adding that the DOC “cannot possibly understand the function of
the drugs if it believes this order of drug administration is appropriate.”83

78. In the modern death penalty era, Oklahoma has conducted more
executions than all but two other states, despite the fact that it has not conducted an
execution since 2015. In the modern era, Texas has executed 569 people. Virginia
has executed 113. Oklahoma has executed 112. See Executions by State and Region
Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-state-and-region-since1976 [https://perma.cc/7FSW-Q87L].
79. See Alper, supra note 50.
80. Berger, supra note 46, at 751.
81. See Alper, supra note 50.
82. See Affidavit of Marvin Polk, North Carolina Department of Corrections
Warden of Central Prison at 2, Rowsey v. Beck, No. 5:04-CT-04-Bo (E.D.N.C.
Jan. 6, 2004) (describing protocol used in all 18 executions he has presided over in
North Carolina); see also Declaration of Mark J. S. Heath, M.D., at 17, Patton v.
Jones, No. 5:06-cv-00591-F (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006) (describing Oklahoma
lethal injection protocol).
83. Declaration of Mark J. S. Heath, M.D., supra note 82, at 4 (summary of
opinions). Dr. Heath’s discussion of the point later in the document is worth
repeating here:
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As another example, Tennessee’s original lethal injection protocol just cut
and pasted “lethal injection” over its prior references to “electrocution,”
resulting in a lethal injection protocol that instructed executioners to shave
the inmate’s head and have a fire extinguisher handy.84 In the world of
computer science, the acronym GIGO—garbage in, garbage out—comes to
mind.85 The quality of what goes into a decision-making process has a
material effect on the quality of what comes out of it, and lethal injection is
no exception to the rule.
These are the consequences of the dearth of agency expertise, a
problem no less acute today than it was forty years ago when lethal
injection was adopted. When it comes to lethal injection, there are no
experts. There are just people who do not know what they are doing trying
their best to get the job done.
As Eric Berger observes, “Administrative law issues get to the
heart of what is wrong with many states’ lethal injection procedures.” 86
Thus far, I have pointed to problems of delegation and expertise. I turn to
the problem of transparency next.
III. TRANSPARENCY
Transparency is one of the “hallmarks of American administrative
law.”87 Agencies are staffed with unelected administrative personnel who
are not directly politically accountable, and transparency serves as a
counterweight to this deficiency, ensuring that the public at least has access
to information about what agencies are doing.88 If people do not know what
The ODOC [Oklahoma Department of Corrections] protocol
calls for the administration of thiopental after [emphasis in
original] the administration of two doses of potassium chloride.
As soon as the potassium chloride perfuses the inmate’s heart, his
heart will stop beating and his circulation will stop. He will be
dead. It is senseless to administer anesthetic to a dead person.
That the ODOC does not understand that its second dose of
anesthetic can serve no purpose in ameliorating pain suggests,
once again, that the ODOC does not understand the lethal
injection process.
Id. at 17.
84. See Segura, supra note 43.
85. See GIGO, TECH TERMS (Mar. 4, 2015), https://techterms.com/definition/
gigo [https://perma.cc/Z7D6-ZGX6] (“Stands for ‘Garbage In, Garbage Out.’
GIGO is a computer science acronym that implies bad input will result in bad
output.”).
86. Berger, supra note 10, at 326.
87. William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative
Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 171 (2009).
88. See Berger, supra note 17, at 16 (“Agency transparency is also an
important factor in determining agency accountability. If agencies operate in secret,
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agencies are doing, they cannot very well petition their representatives to do
something about it. In this way, transparency provides an opportunity for
accountability that agencies otherwise lack.
The importance of transparency in administrative law is clear from
the various rules that promote it. State administrative procedure acts
(APAs), like their federal counterpart, require agencies to provide notice of
proposed actions that they are considering, as well as an opportunity for
public comment, absent narrow exceptions.89 In short, they require some
modicum of transparency in the decision-making process, while creating an
opportunity for agencies to get input from the public and outside experts. In
addition, state APAs impose record-keeping requirements on agencies so
that their decision-making is subject to public scrutiny and judicial
review.90 State Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) likewise promote
transparency and government accountability by providing access to agency
records, again absent narrow exceptions.91 Each of these devices works to
promote transparency in the agency decision-making process, providing
citizens with information about what administrative agencies are doing and
the reasoning behind the decisions that they make.
Yet here again, these features of administrative law are
conspicuously absent in the context of lethal injection. Far from the
transparency that marks the ordinary administrative decision-making
process, state corrections departments devise lethal injection protocols
entirely outside the purview of the public eye. The public does not see how
decisions about lethal injection are made, so aside from a select few
the people and their elected representatives cannot know what government is doing.
Inadequate transparency, thus, undermines political accountability.”); Eric Berger,
Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in
Constitutional Decision-Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2065 (2011)
(“Governmental accountability is premised on popular monitoring of governmental
activities; if the people cannot know what their government is doing, accountability
is severely compromised. The risk of inadequate transparency is heightened in the
agency setting, where officials are usually unelected and where the layers of
bureaucracy and technical nature of the subject matter often shield a department’s
affairs from public scrutiny.”).
89. See State Administrative Procedure Acts differ across states, obviously,
but one can get a sense of their provisions from the Uniform Law Commission’s
Model Administrative Procedure Act, which contains provisions on public access,
record-keeping, and notice-and-comment requirements. See NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, REVISED (2010), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home
?CommunityKey=f184fb0c-5e31-4c6d-8228-7f2b0112fa42 [https://perma.cc/Q5V
D-DL39].
90. See id.
91. For a collection of state FOIAs, see NATIONAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
COALITION, STATE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS, at https://www.nfoic.org/
coalitions/state-foi-resources/state-freedom-of-information-laws.
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people—the lawyers litigating lethal injection claims, a handful of
investigative journalists, and a random law professor here and there—no
one knows just how bad the decision-making actually is.
States thwart transparency in the lethal injection context in several
ways. First, a number of states exempt their corrections department from
the reach of the state APA, while others exempt their corrections
department from the reach of the APA at least when it comes to lethal
injection.92 To the extent that corrections departments are not subject to the
APA’s requirements in devising lethal injection protocols, they are not
subject to the notice-and-comment process that serves as the primary
mechanism by which agency action is exposed to public scrutiny, or to the
record-keeping requirements that force them to show their work.93 Nothing
to see means nothing to challenge other than the APA exemptions
themselves, and those have mostly failed.94
92. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4002(B)(9) (exempting agency action
from the APA when it relates to “[i]nmates of prisons or other such facilities or
parolees therefrom”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(12)(B)(vi) (2011) (exempting
agency action relating to inmates in a correctional facility from the definition of a
“Rule” under the state APA); MO. REV. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (2000) (exempting a
“statement concerning only inmates of an institution under the control of the
department of corrections” from the definition of a “Rule” under the state APA);
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.030(1)(c) (state APA does not apply to the department
of corrections with respect to persons in the department’s custody or subject to
their jurisdictions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604.1(a) (“The Administrative Procedure
Act shall not apply to standards, procedures, or regulations promulgated” by state
department of corrections regarding method of execution). For an insightful
comment about corrections department regulations as “a kind of no man’s land” of
administrative regulation more generally, see Giovanna Shay, Ad Law
Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329 (2009).
93. This also means that state corrections departments are deprived of the
public comment procedure that at least in theory could provide valuable input, a
harm of its own given the agency’s lack of expertise.
94. See, e.g., Hill v. Owens, 738 S.E.2d 56, 59–60 (Ga. 2013) (compliance
with state APA in promulgating lethal injection protocol is not required); Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311 (Tenn. 2005) (interpreting the state
APA to not govern lethal injection); Conner v. North Carolina Council of State,
716 S.E.2d 836, 845–46 (N.C. 2011) (holding that North Carolina’s lethal injection
protocol is not subject to the APA); Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415,
432–33 (Va. 2008) (holding that Virginia’s lethal injection protocol is not subject
to the state APA); Jackson v. Danberg, No. 07M-09-141 (RRC), 2008 WL
1850585, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that Delaware’s lethal
injection protocol is not subject to state APA); Order Denying Temporary
Restraining Order And/Or Stay, Hightower v. Donald, No. 2007CV135682, 2007
WL 4355844, at *4 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2007) (“[T]he promulgation of these
protocols regarding lethal injection by the [Georgia] Department of Corrections are
not subject to the requirements of the APA.”); Middleton v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 278
S.W.3d 193, 198 (Mo. 2009) (upholding statutory exemption); Brown v. Vail, 237
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Second, states have cut access to information about agency
decision-making in the context of lethal injection in other ways. One
searches in vain, for example, for regulations governing the process by
which a lethal injection protocol is chosen. There is no established process,
and thus the decision-making that occurs is off-grid and in the shadows
from the start.95
Moreover, even when there happens to be a record of how a lethal
injection protocol was chosen, DOCs routinely resist sharing it, citing
security exemptions under the state’s FOIA.96 For example, in the wake of
its 2013 botched execution of William Happ, the Florida DOC refused to
answer questions about how it decided to use midazolam as the first drug in

P.3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (lethal injection protocol is not a “rule” under the state
APA and thus compliance with APA is not required). But see Bowling v. Kentucky
Dep’t of Corr., 301 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Ky. 2009) (lethal injection protocol is an
administrative regulation subject to the state APA); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25,
79-80 (Md. 2006) (also stands for the proposition that lethal injection protocol is an
administrative regulation subject to the state APA).
95. See Leonidas G. Koniaris et. al, Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal Injection
for Execution, 365 THE LANCET 1361, 1412 (Apr. 16-22, 2005) (noting that neither
Virginia nor Texas, states that account for nearly half of the nation’s executions,
has a record of how it developed its execution protocol); Editorial: Virginia’s
Execution Dilemma, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, March 3, 2016, at A12. (“In any
event, capital-punishment foes do make a good point when they note that the
choice of lethal-injection drugs is entirely up to the discretion of the department’s
director. The cocktail is spelled out neither in state law nor in regulation. In fact,
even the process by which the cocktail is chosen is not spelled out by regulation.”).
96. Some states exempt information about lethal injection from FOIA by
statute. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(i)(1)(C) (2013) (“[A] person shall not
disclose in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act of
1967…[d]ocuments, records, or information that concern the procedures [regarding
lethal injection and its implementation].”); see also Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91
WASH. L. REV. 929, 965 (2016) (“Many states design and implement their lethal
injection procedures behind a veil of secrecy, which makes it extremely difficult
for inmates to know how they will be executed. . . . Indeed, some states have
passed lethal injection secrecy laws that deem execution procedures a state secret,
sometimes explicitly exempting them from state Freedom of Information Act
inquiries.”) (citing state statutes in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Tennessee); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Lethal Secrecy: State
Secrecy Statutes Keep Execution Information From the Public, 38 THE NEWS
MEDIA & THE LAW (Spring 2014), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
01/Spring_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/43XD-9RB8] (“In denying requests for
information regarding the identity of drug and medical suppliers involved in
executions, many states rely on existing exceptions to their public information acts,
such as protections for individuals’ physical safety, certain law enforcement and
prosecutorial information, and information related to ‘biological agents or
toxins.’”).
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its three-drug protocol, which it had piloted on Happ.97 “Those decisions
are exempt from public record because they could impact the safety and
security of inmates and officers who are involved in that process,” the DOC
spokesperson said.98 It is a mystery how knowing the process by which a
drug was chosen could pose a threat to safety or security, but that’s what
the public was left with—that and a lot of questions. Did the Florida DOC
review the relevant pharmacological literature? Did it consider other readily
available, less risky alternatives to the protocol it chose? Why did it not just
choose the protocol used for animal euthanasia? With no records or
regulations to review, the answer is nobody knows.
Third, the more recent phenomenon of delegating the decisionmaking process to lawyers places a blanket of secrecy over the entire drug
selection process. Having lawyers involved in the drug selection process
means that the process is protected from disclosure under the attorney-client
privilege and attorney work product doctrine.99 It means that the entire drug
selection process is hermetically sealed from scrutiny—exempt from even
the court-ordered discovery process. Critics say this is the very point.100
Fourth and finally, state corrections department officials employ
informal measures to prevent public scrutiny of their lethal injection
processes. A prime example is what happened when Louisiana’s chief legal
counsel for the DOC reached out to the Texas DOC for guidance on lethal
injection in 2003.101 Lacking access to experts, state DOCs have historically
gone to each other for advice, and Texas, being the nationwide leader in
executions, has played an outsized role in this regard. Over time, numerous
state corrections department officials have consulted the Texas DOC in
developing their own lethal injection protocols,102 and lethal injection
litigation in Louisiana showed what these sorts of consultations look like. In
the Louisiana litigation, the state’s counsel for the DOC testified that when
she reached out to Texas, the warden refused to advise her over the phone,
explaining that “he didn’t say these things on the phone that he would
rather say in person.” That phone call led to a trip to Texas, and when
Louisiana’s counsel and her entourage met with the warden, he “asked if
97. See Tasneem Nashrulla, What 13 States Aren’t Telling You About How
They Execute Prisoners, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 16, 2014), https://www.buzzfeed
news.com/article/tasneemnashrulla/what-13-states-are-not-telling-you-about-howthey-kill-peopl [https://perma.cc/7Z52-EQ4M].
98. Id.
99. See Alper, supra note 50.
100. See id. (discussing the “‘stick a lawyer in the room’ strategy” in states’
quest for lethal injection secrecy).
101. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 16.
102. At the very least, state corrections department officials from Colorado,
Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming have
consulted with Texas corrections department officials about lethal injection. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 16, n.52.
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any of us had tape recorders, if any of us were wired” before discussing his
approach to lethal injection.103 The Texas warden’s approach to lethal
injection on the merits is a story of its own104—but here the point is the
lengths to which Texas officials went to keep their information secret.
We have glimpses of the steps that state DOCs take to protect their
decision-making processes from scrutiny—the lack of information is more
than just exemption from state APA requirements and a lack of records and
regulations. But by and large, the best indication of these efforts is their
success. Outside of the litigation context, which has slowly chipped away at
the wall of secrecy that state DOCs have built, the result is a complete
blackout of information.
It is worth noting that the measures that corrections departments
take to protect their decision-making processes occur against a backdrop of
secrecy in the lethal injection context more generally. Secrecy as to drug
suppliers.105 Secrecy as to executioners’ basic qualifications.106 Secrecy as
to the protocols themselves.107 “[T]he only overarching constant appears to
103. Id. at 16.
104. For the rest of the story, see LAIN, supra note 21.
105. See Robin Konrad, Behind the Curtain: Secrecy and the Death Penalty in
the United States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://files.death
penaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/SecrecyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3FF-GCL
A]; see also infra note 106.
106. See id.; Dahlia Lithwick, The Capital Punishment Cover-Up, SLATE
MAG. (Feb. 3, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/02/capitalpunishment-cover-up-virginia-hides-all-information-relating-to-the-executionprocess.html [https://perma.cc/HYL2-5SGD] (“Amid the recent rash of highprofile screw-ups in executions, new cover-up measures have been passed in more
than a dozen states, allowing departments of corrections to increasingly refuse to
disclose where their drugs come from, how and if they were tested, and whether
corrections officers are qualified to administer them correctly.”); Death Penalty
Due Process Review Project, Report on Resolution 108B, AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (2015),
https://www.in.gov/ipdc/files/ABA%20Report%20-%20Execution%20protocol%2
0-108B.pdf [https://perma.cc/U58R-F6J9] (“In the modern era of capital
punishment, secrecy has surround many aspects of the imposition of a death
sentence in the United States. States have sought to shield not just the identities of
executioners and other members of the execution team, but the details of those
individuals’ basic qualifications, pertinent information about the drug formulas
used in lethal injections, and the protocols that instruct how the execution is to be
carried out.”); see also infra note 107.
107. See supra notes 95–96; Berger, supra note 10, at 304 (“Many states’
refusal to disclose the details of their own procedures compounds the problem. As
recently as October 2007, only six lethal injection states provided what Professor
Denno termed ‘complete’ public protocols, and even those protocols did not give
details about important information such as the qualifications and training of the
execution team members. . . . Relatedly, states also routinely resist discovery in an
effort to divulge as little information about the method by which they plan to
execute . . . .”).
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be states’ desire for secrecy regarding execution practices,” writes Debby
Denno of the multitude of changes swirling around lethal injection.
However problematic lethal injection might be, she says, “states are
unwavering in their desire to conceal this disturbing reality from the
public.”108
In recent years, the problem has only grown worse. As several good
government groups have noted, states in the last several years have
“intensified their efforts to obscure information regarding the development
and implementation of lethal injection protocols.”109 This move, as Eric
Berger has noted, is largely a reflection of the fact that revealing such
information would “highlight[] the failed processes and delegations by
which the protocol was adopted.”110 Having seen for ourselves what those
delegations and decision-making processes are, it only makes sense that
DOCs would try to hide them. I would. Wouldn’t you?
All this is to say that when it comes to transparency in the agency
decision-making process, lethal injection turns the rules on their head.
Instead of public disclosures, notice-and-comment procedures, and recordkeeping requirements, we see exemptions, obfuscation, and secrecy,
rendering information about how a state DOC arrived at a lethal injection
protocol notoriously hard to come by.
The implications are profound. No transparency means no public
scrutiny to trigger outrage over these decision-making processes so that
democracy can do its thing. And no record-keeping or other rule-making
requirements mean no processes for inmates to challenge, and no records by
which courts can determine whether a DOC’s decision-making was
108. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J.
1331, 1382 (2014).
109. THE CONST. PROJECT’S DEATH PENALTY COMM., IRREVERSIBLE ERROR:
RECOMMENDED REFORMS FOR PREVENTING AND CORRECTING ERRORS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 141 (2014) (quoting Denno, supra note
108, at 1382); Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, Report on Resolution
108B, supra note 106, at 1 (“[T]he past few years have been particularly
noteworthy, as many states have increased efforts to cloak their execution
procedures in secrecy. Many states have passed statutes that broaden the categories
of information that will be kept confidential, exempting information about
execution practices and procedures from public disclosure requirements and
exempting departments of corrections from the public rulemaking requirements of
administrative procedures act laws. The result of this troubling trend is that many
jurisdictions have made secret information that may have once been readily
available concerning their execution procedures, and other states are trying to do
so. The American Bar Association is concerned about this movement toward
increased secrecy and regressive policies surrounding the processes by which
prisoners are executed by lethal injection, particularly given the gravity of the
authority exercised by state and federal governments in the execution of
prisoners.”).
110. Berger, supra note 10, at 304.
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arbitrary and capricious (and from what we know, there is a good chance
that it was).111
This, in turn, further entrenches problematic decision-making in the
lethal injection context. Corrections department officials (and shadow, nonDOC decision-makers) can design protocols without serious consideration
of the issues that minimally competent decision-making requires.112 If no
one knows what the DOC is doing, it can pretty much do what it wants.
Lack of transparency is in large part how we got into this mess. And it is a
large part of the reason we cannot manage to get out of it.
CONCLUSION
Having made three observations about how administrative law
norms play out in the lethal injection context, I close with a few thoughts
about the implications of my analysis. First are the implications for
executions by lethal injection. Lethal injection today is more unreliable than
at any other time in its forty-plus years of existence.113 Drug shortages have
forced innovation, and innovation has led to problematic protocols. Botched
executions have many causes, but problematic protocols and executioner
incompetence are at the top of the list, and both lie at the feet of state
DOCs. The perverse way that administrative law norms play out in the
lethal injection context is partly to blame for this state of affairs. Torturous
deaths at the hands of the state are a predictable result of the unlimited
discretion that DOCs have to make decisions about matters decidedly
outside their area of expertise, particularly when no one is watching.
Next are the implications for the death penalty more broadly. As
noted at the beginning of this essay, “death is different” is supposed to
mean more protections for those subject to the ultimate punishment, more
protections when the stakes are literally life and death. Yet where the
rubber actually hits the road—where death sentences come to full fruition
as state executions—the opposite is true. How can it be that where the death
penalty is most concrete, the protections are most ephemeral? The way that
administrative law norms work in the execution context speaks volumes

111. For a strong argument that such obfuscation denies condemned inmates
access to the courts and other due process guarantees, see Eric Berger, Lethal
Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367,
1367 (2014).
112. See Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, Report on Resolution
108B, supra note 106, at 12 (“[P]rocedures that are created in secrecy and
maintained without transparency are far more likely to be ill-conceived and poorly
or inconsistently administered.”).
113. See Denno, supra note 108, at 1380 (“The lethal injection procedure is
more dangerous and inconsistent than ever, and the result is a perpetual effort by
states to maintain secrecy at a time when transparency is most paramount.”).
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about the strength of our commitment to ensuring that when the state takes
life, it does its job right.
Then there are the implications for administrative law. I am not an
administrative law scholar. I came to administrative law because the death
penalty brought me here—because administrative law is an integral part of
the story of why executions by lethal injection in this country are so messed
up. But even from an outsider’s view, it seems to me that a perverted
version of death penalty exceptionalism is no better for administrative law
than it is for the death penalty itself. The execution context shows state
legislatures abdicating responsibility with blanket delegations of legislative
power. And this apparently passes muster. It shows agency decisionmaking that is breathtakingly incompetent, a reflection of the fact that
DOCs have been delegated authority that is clearly and unequivocally
outside their area of expertise. This, too, apparently passes muster. And it
shows that despite all the talk about the importance of transparency and
accountability in the agency decision-making process, in the end, that is all
it is—talk.
Administrative law scholars might soothe themselves with the fact
that this is death penalty exceptionalism—oh that’s just how administrative
norms play out when executions are at stake. But the way that
administrative law norms work in the execution context also says
something about the strength of our commitment to those norms more
broadly. It shows that the bedrock principles and fundamental assumptions
of administrative law can be suspended whenever the state wants. Indeed,
it shows that they can be suspended even when the state exercises its most
awesome and consequential power—when the state takes human life.
In the end, when the death penalty meets administrative law,
administrative law norms get sullied and the death penalty loses the one
comfort one might otherwise have: that when the state takes human life, it
takes extra care to do it right. In the administrative law context, death
penalty exceptionalism turns “death is different” on its head. And I cannot
help but conclude, standing at the intersection of these two great bodies of
law, that the result is not good for either.

